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THE PROCESS OF MAKING GOOD DECISIONS
ABOUT THE USE OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF MAN*
by
LOUIS HAMILLt
Economists have repeatedly, and I believe correctly, insisted that
the central issue in the problem of using resources wisely is that some
effective way must be found to allocate limited resources to meet
many, and competing, demands.' Economists also assert that only
economic theory provides an adequate analytical framework for
attacking the problems of conservation. 2 Herfindahl and Kneese put
the point strongly:
[T]he discipline of economics is central to progress on these problems,
for it is economics alone that can formulate these problems in the
terms to which they must finally be reduced, namely the balancing of
our varied desires 3in these matters against the cost of satisfying them
in various degrees.
On this point there is considerable agreement. Most people concerned with problems of resource-use seem to agree that economists
have developed the best approach to the problem. It is typical practice among resource analysts to rely on economists to formulate the
social aspects of resource-use, and to provide procedures for choosing between alternative uses of resources. Economists, in turn, rely
on economic theory as the basis for their thinking.
From the writer's experience, this confidence in economic theory
is misplaced. There are, in fact, major objections to the use of
economic theory as a basis for making decisions about the use of
* This article is an expansion of The Problem of Applying Biogeography to Conser'vation: A Suggested Solution, which was presented to the Section on Biogeography
of the 20th International Geographical Congress, London, England, July 1964.
t Associate Professor, Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary,
Alberta.
1. See, e.g., 0. Herfindahl & A. Kneese, Quality of the Environment: An Economic
Approach to Some Problems in Using Land, Water, and Air at vi (1965) ; A. Scott,
Natural Resources: The Economics of Conservation 2 (1955).
2. See, e.g., 0. Eckstein, Water Resource Development (1958) ; chs. 1, 2; A. Scott,
op. cit., ch. 1.
3. 0. Herfindahl and A. Kneese, supra, p. vi.
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resources or environments. The most important of these objections

are as follows:
1. There is no substantial agreement about which theory is to be
used. There are a number of theories, and there are substantial disagreements about assumptions, sub-theories, procedures, and the
like.
2. To be fully operational as a basis for making decisions about
resources and environments, any economic theory would require that
all aspects of the problem be quantifiable, and subject to numerical,
mathematical, and graphic analysis. Data and measurement limitations make this impossible in many cases where quantification is already possible. But there are many aspects of resource and environmental problems where it is necessary to deal with qualitative, or
verbal, information. The latter can not be unambiguously incorporated into economic analysis. One might sum up this objection by saying that insofar as economics is operational, it is accounting. Anything that is not likely to be incorporated successfully into accounting, including regional or national accounting, is not likely to become
fully operational.
3. All economic theories make general assumptions about the
economic behavior of individuals, firms, and governments. These
assumptions seldom are realistic, 4 and never are accurate enough
or specific enough to provide an adequate guide to the use of resources or environments. Furthermore, economists have given little
attention to human behavior in relation to such "intangibles" as demands for security, beauty, pleasant living, good health, freedom
from stress, and the like. Since all decisions about the use of resources or environments must be concerned with human behavior, in
all its bewildering variety and detail, it is necessary to use guidelines
or procedures that do not require the generalized assumptions of
economic theory.
4. Economists have introduced rigor into the analysis of problems of resource use, but the results have not always been an unmixed blessing. For it has several times occurred that propositions
and procedures have become widely accepted as the result of seemingly rigorous demonstrations, and then, for one reason or another,
prove to be in error, or to need substantial modification. They tend
to persist long after their usefulness has ended. This seems to have
4. For a discussion of this point, see H. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, XLIX The American Economic Review, 253-283 (1959).
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occurred in
the case of thinking about the better use of natural
5
resources.

5. All varieties of economic theory require a substantial amount
of time and energy to master. It is probably safe to say that true
competence seldom is achieved in more than one variety of economic
theory. Also, competence seems to require the equivalent of a doctorate in training, study, and research. As economic theories become
more and more elaborated, the training required increases, and the
field of competence narrows. It is obvious that substantial savings
would be effected if operational procedures could be carried on
efficiently without requiring competence in economic theory by their
practitioners.
Fortunately, there is an eminently satisfactory alternative to economic theory for guidance in making decisions about the use of
resources and environments. Every important problem of procedure
involved in achieving the wise use of resources and environments has
been covered in the literature of operations research and management science, and in a much more useful form than in the literature
of economic theory. The writer will attempt to show that a complete
and fully operational set of procedures for achieving the wise use
of resources and environments can by synthesized from the literature of operations research and management science. This set of
procedures is in many ways different from the set of procedures that
seems to be called for by dominant economic theories in this field. At
the same time, it can and does accommodate all of the operational
procedures that have been developed by economists.
5. A useful example of the latter objection occurred recently in the forestry profession, creating a crisis which still is in process of resolution. Forestry schools have
relied on silviculturists and forest economists to provide the basic rationale for forest
management practice. The result has been an emphasis on wood production and on
monetary values in making decisions about forest land use. Foresters have had great
difficulty, as a profession, in adjusting to forest recreation as a legitimate use of forest
land. They have tended to resist the inclusion of recreation in forest management planning, and have tried to obstruct true multiple-use of forest lands when it seemed to conflict with maximum wood production. Since the general public wanted greatly increased
opportunities for outdoor recreation, the forestry profession found that it had suddenly
acquired a bad public image, and that the advice of foresters was being systematically
ignored in connection with outdoor recreation developments. The problem has been
recognized, and a lively discussion has occurred in The Journal of Forestry, the journal
of the Society of American Foresters. Many participants in this debate have indicated
the need for a broader professional viewpoint. At the same time, there has been much
interest in a re-evaluation of forestry education, partly to avoid the recurrence of this
type of problem.
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Operations research and management science are terms applied
to the activities of a group of specialists who have worked out procedures to make business and government organizations more efficient. Operations research received its major impetus during World
War II, when concentrated effort was directed toward making military operations more efficient. Because of its spectacular success it
has received continued and increasing support. It has changed drastically the conduct of business and government, has revolutionized
production and distribution technique, and has created whole new
industries.
Although much of this improvement has been attributed to the
use of electronic computers, this has not been the only source of
improvement. Probably the most important source of the general
improvement in the operations of business and government has come
from detailed analysis of these operations and, as a result of this
analysis, a clearer understanding of what "efficient operation" consists of. In attempting to achieve the ideal economic behavior with
which economic theorizing has been primarily concerned, a large
number of specialists have carried out an extensive operational
analysis of the relevant economic theories.
The conclusions to be arrived at from examining the literature of
operations research and management science seem quite clear. Efficiency consists mainly of a set of procedures which will attain a
desired goal. And the information used in this set of procedures is
primarily specific; generalizations and theories are of little value.
Thus, there is a substantial difference in approach between practitioners of operations research and economic theorists.
Although many of the practitioners of operations research and
management science have been economists, their behavior while
engaged in this activity has been quite different from that of academic economists. These differences are very important for the
following discussion. Academic economists are concerned mainly
with developing a body of knowledge about different aspects of
economic activity, and with passing it on by means of lectures, writing, and other media. Furthermore, this body of knowledge should
consist, ideally, of generalizations and theories. Operations research
and management science, on the other hand, are not interested primarily in developing a body of knowledge; they are far more interested in developing sets of procedures that will produce efficient action. That is why this activity is sometimes called activity analysis,
as well as operations research and management science.
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The relevant literature is that concerned with the process of
decision-making. In order to organize this large amount of material,
we will deal first with a simplified statement of the process of making
decisions. We will then consider the procedures needed to make this
simplified model operational. The implications of the operational
decision process for wise use of resources will then be discussed.

I
THE SIMPLIFIED DECISION MODEL

An idealized model of the rational choice process served as the
starting point for much work in operations research and management science. Statistical-decision-theorists, especially, have stated the
normative model explicitly, and have used it to structure their development of statistical-decision-theory. 6 It may be summarized as
follows:
1. Decision is required only when there are two or more alternative courses of action, only one of which may be taken.
2. Each alternative course of action will have different consequences, depending on the actual conditions that prevail in the
problem environment in the future.
3. Efficient decision making requires the consideration of all the
possible alternative courses of action in all the alternative future
conditions of the problem environment.
4. The decision maker must have a set of criteria which permit
him to evaluate all combinations of actions and consequences and to
7
choose the preferred combination.
5. Action will be taken immediately on the preferred alternative.
The decision-table which is shown below, is a device used in some
statistics textbooks to facilitate the explicit consideration of all possible combinations of the alternative courses of action and of future
conditions in the problem environment. This table can be extended
indefinitely to include any number of alternative actions and future
conditions of the problem environment. 8
6. For an introduction to statistical-decision-theory, see I. Bross, Design for Decision (1953). Two basic works in the field are: L. Savage, The Foundations of
Statistics (1954) ; R. Schlaifer, Probability and Statistics for Business Decisions (1958).
7. Schlaifer suggests that any decision under uncertainty can be systematized by
attaching numerical values to the consequences of every possible act, given every possible event; attaching a numerical weight to every possible future event, and selecting
the act whose weighted average value is highest. R. Schlaifer, Introduction to Statistics
for Business Decisions 3-7 (1961).
8. See, e.g., E. Kurnow, G. Glasser & F. Ottman, Statistics for Business Decisions,
10 (1959).
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STATISTICAL DECISION TABLE
Alternative
Action
Condition
1

Possible Future Conditions
in Problem Environment
Condition
Condition
3
2

Action A

Consequences
Action A
Given
Condition 1

Consequences
Action A
Given
Condition 2

Consequences
Action A
Given
Condition 3

Action B

Consequences
Action B
Given
Condition 1

Consequences
Action B
Given
Condition 2

Consequences
Action B
Given
Condition 3

This simplified model of the process of decision-making is either
implicit or explicit in much economic theory. However, students of
business and government found that the assumptions of economists
about the completeness and efficiency of this process were not found
in reality. In attempting to make economic theory operational in
business firms, it has been found that much of the seemingly relevant
theory was either in error or was not focused on the more important
parts of the problem. This has been demonstrated most forcefully
in connection with the subject of decision-making, which has proved
to be the central issue in the improvement of business and government practice. Cyert, Simon, and Trow give the following summary
of some of the deficiencies that have been identified in the application
of economic theory to this problem:
It is extremely doubtful whether the only considerable body of decision-making theory that has been available in the past-that provided by economics-does in fact provide a realistic account of decision-making in large organizations operating in a complex world.
In economics and statistics the rational choice process is described
somewhat as follows:
(1) An individual is confronted with a number of different, specified
alternative courses of action.
(2) To each of these alternatives is attached a set of consequences
that will ensue if that alternative is chosen.
(3) The individual has a system of preferences or "Utilities" that
permit him to rank all sets of consequences according to preference
and to choose that alternative that has the preferred consequences. In
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the case of business decisions the criterion for ranking is generally assumed to be profit.
If we try to use this framework to describe how real human beings
go about making choices in a real world, we soon recognize that we
need to incorporate in our description of the choice process several elements that are missing from the economic model:
(1 ) The alternatives are not usually "given" but must be sought, and
hence it is necessary to include the search for alternatives as an important part of the process.
(2) The information as to what consequences are attached to which
alternatives is seldom a "given", but, instead, the search for consequences is another important segment of the decision-making task.
(3) The comparisons among alternatives are not usually made in
terms of simple, single criterion [sic] like profit. One reason is that
there are often important consequences that are so intangible as to
make an evaluation in terms of profit difficult or impossible. In place
of searching for the best alternative, the decision-maker is usually concerned with finding a satisfactory alternative-one that will attain a
specified goal and at the same time satisfy a number of auxiliary conditions.
(4) Often, in the real world, the problem itself is not a "given", but,
instead, searching for significant problems to which organizational
attention should be turned becomes an important organizational task.9
This suggests the necessity to look at each part of the process in
some detail and to consider some of the difficulties that are met in
practice. This will permit a better understanding of what is needed
to make this excellent guiding model operational and how it can be
applied to problems of resource use.
II
MAKING THE DECISION MODEL OPERATIONAL
The literature of operations research and management science
provides extensive documentation of the problems and procedures
involved in making the decision model operational. 10 Much of this
9. R. Cyert, H. Simon & D. Trow Observation of a Business Decision, The Journal
of Business, 237 (1956).
10. Some important discussions are found in Activity Analysis of Production and
Allocation (T. Koopmans ed. 1951) ; C. Churchman, R. Ackoff & E. Arnoff, Introduction
to Operations Research (1957) ; A. Vaszonyi, Scientific Programming in Business and
Industry (1958) ; R. Schlaifer, Probability and Statistics for Business Decisions (1958) ;
H. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision (1960); N. Barish, Economic
Analysis for Engineering and Managerial Decision Making (1962).
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material has been summarized and synthesized by Simon and his
colleagues."
Efficient decision-making requires the conscious and explicit consideration of each element of the decision process in an orderly way.
The following discussion takes each element of the decision process
in turn and focuses on aspects of the process which are important in
relating decision-making to the wise use of resources.
A.

Initiation of the Process
The decision process usually is begun by the recognition that something must be done. Often, this is simply recognition of the fact that
it is no longer possible to continue the existing pattern of behavior or
action.
Problem-solving may be taught of as a special case of decisionmaking. Problem recognition is essentially the recognition that action is required, and that more than one course of action is available.
Many think of it as recognition that an actual or developing situation is different from a desired situation; this is also the recognition
that action is needed. The main characteristic of problems that distinguishes them from other occasions for choice and action is a feeling of urgency. The procedures for efficient decision-making encompass most cases of problem-solving.
B.

Identification of Alternative Actions
All of the alternative courses of action must be identified and
stated to the extent necessary. The objectives of the decision-maker
provide the criteria for determining the number and the degree of
difference between alternative courses of action which must be considered.
The identification of alternative courses of action often is a crucial part of the process because of the possibility that custom, habit,
or other cultural or institutional restraints may prevent the consideration of some alternative courses of action. A good case in point is
the use of fire as a tool for control of disease, prevention of wildfire,
and stand improvement in the United States. Some foresters were so
imbued with the necessity of wildfire prevention that they could not
11. The following works contain most of the important material, and have references to other works: The New Science of Management Decision, id.; Simon,
Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, XLIX The
American Economic Review 253-283 (1959) ; H. Simon & J. March, Organizations
(1958).
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consider the use of controlled forest fires. Others opposed it in fear
that it would destroy the effectiveness of years of educating the public in fire prevention. When these and other objections were overcome, controlled forest fires proved to be feasible
alternatives to
12
cutting and other forest treatments in some areas.
C.

ForecastingConsequences of Action
The choice between alternative courses of action usually is based
on the consideration together of each action and its expected consequences. Therefore, the next step in the process is to identify and to
state explicitly the consequences of each alternative course of action.
This requires a number of forecasts of the problem environment and
of the interaction between each possible action and its environment.
All of the possible future conditions of the problem environment
must be stated, within reasonable limits. The number of possible future conditions of the problem environment which must be considered is partly a function of the objectives of the decision-maker, and
partly a function of the time and resources available for study.
There are, of course, many techniques available for forecasting
economic and social conditions. 13 Forecasting would be a comparatively simple process if decision-makers could control important aspects of the problem environment. However, this seldom is possible
in connection with important resource-use decisions. Therefore, forecasting is not only necessary, but also difficult and uncertain.
Of course, the absolute limiting factor in every forecast is the impossibility of forecasting the future accurately, except by accident,
no matter what our technique or data. It would be a healthy development to face this fact and to stop seeking perfect prediction. Much
time and effort has been wasted in searching for invariant relationships that would permit perfect prediction. Perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on mathematical techniques of forecasting.
Some practitioners of operations research and management science continue to maintain the myth that uncertainty can be overcome
by the use of sophisticated techniques. Statistical-decision theorists,
for example, have claimed that their techniques have great utility for
making decisions in conditions of uncertainty. They seem to assume
that assigning values and probabilities to future events is easy, and
concern themselves only with techniques of computation using these
numbers. However, the crucial information for statistical decision
12. A. Schiff, Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service (1962).
13. See e.g., V. Bassie, Economic Forecasting (1958).
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rules are the statistical probabilities of future events and the estimates of the value of future events. Statistical decision rules are reliable only where events are repeated often enough to be estimated
with reasonable accuracy. Experience in business has demonstrated
that one cannot assign useful probabilities and values to future
events without detailed knowledge and forecasts. The fact that most
decisions about the use of major resources are made under conditions
of uncertainty indicates the impossibility of accurate numerical forecasts in such cases. Under these circumstances, the use of subjective
probabilities in statistical decision rules may do no more than dress
up an educated guess. All numerical technique would be more useful
if it were shorn of mystical promises.
Techniques and information for forecasting the conditions of resources under alternative programs of resource management are not
worked out as well as one might expect, considering the fact that
there is a body of professionals concerned with each resource. Biologists, agriculturists, foresters, and other specialists have done much
detailed work on forecasting for small units and under very limited
conditions. They have given little attention to forecasts for large
areas which reflect the results of major alternatives in the use of resources. Many major studies have been made recently to forecast the
demand and supply of various natural resources in the United States
and Canada. Technique does not seem to have been a limiting factor
in these forecasts; indeed technique often outruns the limitations of
the available data. Almost every resource forecast suffers from lack
of data. Much of the available information is not suitable for the
kind of forecasting for which it is used. It is not always possible to
remedy such problems of inadequate data quickly, nor can they be
solved adequately by elaborate techniques of data manipulation.
A case in point is the forecasting of the effects on forest resources
of different levels of cutting and silvicultural practice. Much experimental work has been done on small areas, but it is often difficult to
extend it to large areas. The author had extreme difficulty in forecasting the effects of several alternative rates of cutting and levels of
management in studies of the forest resources of western Oregon." *
The problem of technique was overcome without great difficulty, but
the available data made accurate forecasts impossible with any technique. Much of the data that was used in this study had become
available by accident; it was collected originally for some purpose
14. L. Hamill, A Forecast of the Forest Resource and Industry of Douglas and
Lane Counties ch. 3 (1963).
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other than forecasting. Similar attempts in other parts of the United
States have suffered from the same problem. National and regional
forecasts are made by government forestry agencies, but they are of
doubtful accuracy because of deficiencies in the basic data. However,
most such studies have contributed something to either technique or
data and an efficient and standardized approach to the problem is developing. The progress has been rather slow, and is possibly a reflection of inertia within the profession of forestry, where the emphasis
has been on the techniques and data required to manage individual
forest properties. Similar problems exist in forecasting agricultural,
grazing, fish, and water resources.
Forecasting conditions in the problem environment is difficult, but
it is even more difficult to forecast the consequences of actions, especially when many courses of action and many future conditions in the
problem environment are being considered. It requires not only a detailed knowledge of the existing situation and of developments in resource management technique, but also an imaginative use of historical materials.
Forecasts must be based on historical experience, but all historical
information does not contribute significantly to usable forecasts. For
example, many existing resource-use problems are the result of a history of no management or poor management. After a resource-use
problem has been recognized, resource management usually is improved. Also, the socio-economic environment is likely to change considerably. Therefore, forecasts will seldom be satisfactory if based
simply on the extension of past experience. Analysts must be selective in choosing subjects for historical study. But they must be imaginative enough to select those historical aspects of a problem which
will be more important in the future than in the past or present. A
case in point is the tremendous increase in demand for wildlands for
recreational use as a result of very rapid economic advances. This
came as a surprise to most of us because not enough imagination had
been used in earlier forecasts. It has been demonstrated repeatedly
in recent major resource studies that the utility of forecasts in most
cases is in direct relationship to detailed knowledge of the problem
environment by the forecasters.
Estimates of the consequences of alternative courses of action
must take into account both the action and the future conditions in
the problem environment. Most of the techniques of graphical and
numerical analysis developed in accounting, economics, engineering,
operations research, management science, and so on, are used at this

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 8

stage of the decision process. The appropriate technique is determined not only by the techniques which are available, but also by the
amounts and kind of information available, the objectives of the decision-maker, the facilities and technical competence available to the
decision-maker, and other considerations. This is one of the crucial
stages in the entire process of decision-making, for it is at this stage
that many decisions begin to take form. It may be very complex when
many courses of action and many conditions of the problem environment are being considered.
Statement of Objectives
After forecasting the consequences of alternative actions, the combinations of actions and their consequences must be valued or ranked.
Valuing or ranking cannot be done properly until the main and auxiliary objectives of the decision-maker have been identified and stated
explicitly. Relationships between the dominant and auxiliary objectives should also be stated to aid in formulating criteria for choice.
Experience has demonstrated that objectives should be stated in
terms of ends, because stating objectives in terms of means restricts
the range of alternatives considered by the decision-maker, and prejudices in advance the success of problem-solving.1 " Objectives must
be specific enough to provide criteria for choosing among alternative
courses of actions. This means in practice that there must often be
more than one acceptable set of objectives.
Although it is a useful guide to state objectives in terms of ends,
instead of means, objectives are much affected by the means available. For example, until very recently it would have seemed absurd
to have a national objective of getting to the moon, because the
means of getting there were not available. Now this objective seems
technically feasible (though it may still be absurd when compared to
other alternative objectives). Similarly, full employment seemed a
social imperative until automation became a reality; now it is necessary to adjust our thinking to large scale unemployment and underemployment without accompanying social problems.
Some mystery seems to surround the formation and statement of
objectives. Objectives are not fixed, but change with social and technical change, and with changes in the way that the decision-maker
perceives the problem environment. Objectives often are not obviD.

15. M. Wood & G. Dantzig, The Programming of Interdependent Activities, in
Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. supra note 10, at 17, 18.
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ous to decision-makers; they must be sought. The identification of
objectives requires the processing of much information. The very act
of processing the necessary information may change the decisionmaker's attitude toward objectives, leading him to accept objectives
he had not considered before, or to reject some he had accepted. The
entire problem environment should be kept under review for the purpose of evaluating existing objectives and identifying possible new
objectives. A flexible attitude should be adopted toward objectives:
they should be revised or discarded as conditions change. The decision-maker should observe and evaluate the effects of his objectives
in accepting and rejecting alternatives available to him. In other
words, the consideration of objectives should be as complete and accurate as any other part of the process of decision-making. The
kinds of objectives which are required to make the decision process
operational are more simple and more specific than the kinds of objectives which appear so often in economic theories.
E.

Ranking Combinations of Actions and Consequences
In the final analysis, the choice between combinations of actions
and their consequences is made by ranking. Therefore, valuing of actions and their consequences is required only to the extent that it will
permit ranking. Both valuing and ranking must be done in terms of
the objectives of the decision-maker. In some cases, but by no means
all, ranking may be the outcome of numerical analysis. In other cases
numerical analysis is not necessary. Numerical analysis is usually required where minimizing or maximizing criteria are used. But even
where decisions can be made without numerical analysis, it is often
helpful, and is a useful check, to use numerical analysis when it is
possible without an excessive expenditure of time and effort. It has
happened repeatedly in studies of resource-use that available techniques of numerical analysis could not be used because the necessary
numerical data was not available.
Cyert, Simon and Trow report that in many cases the choice between alternative courses of action is not made on the basis of single,
simple criteria like profit or cost. There often are important, but intangible, consequences which cannot be analyzed satisfactorily in
terms of profit or cost. Therefore, they say, "In place of searching
for the 'best' alternative, the decision-maker is usually concerned
with finding a satisfactory alternative-one that will attain a speci-
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fled goal and at the same time satisfy a number of auxiliary conditions."16
F.

Instructionsfor Action
The final step of the decision process consists of stating instructions for action to implement the decision. If all parts of the decision
process are executed properly, the instructions for action usually will
follow the decision exactly. If any part of the decision process includes unstated elements, the instructions for action may depart in
some measure from the final decision. In such cases it does not seem
operationally correct to speak of rational decision. One of the most
important contributions of systematic study of the decision process
is the demonstration that the best action is that which is based on
completely explicated thought processes. Without action the most
complete decision process is ineffective, at least where action is called
for. In the final analysis the decision process cannot be separated
completely from the action situation.
Decision ProcessShould be Continuous
After the decision-maker has valued and ranked the alternative
actions and their consequences, it is assumed that the selected action
will be carried out directly. This however does not end the decision
process. The use of the correct procedures does not guarantee making the right decision. Experience, or a review of the problem, may
indicate that the initial decision was wrong. Conditions, available
technique, or the objectives of the decision-maker, may change, and
the selected action may need to be discarded or altered. In addition,
the decision process described requires time for its completion. In
most cases involving problems of resource use, the decision process
may extend over years. Because decision processes operate over a
period of time, and include the collection and processing of information, all aspects of the decision environment may change during the
making of the decision, or the decision-maker's understanding of the
situation may change. Since all the elements of the decision are subject to change, continual review of all of them is required.
Perhaps it is useful, in this connection, to formalize the distinction
between planned and unplanned situations. A planned situation is
one in which the decision-maker can control the future condition of
G.

16. R. Cyert, H. Simon & D. Trow, Observation of a Business Decision, supra note

.APRIL

1968]

USE OF THE ENFIRONMENT

the problem environment. An unplanned situation is one in which the
decision-maker cannot control the future condition of the problem
environment. The practical difference between these two situations is
that the amount of forecasting required is much less for planned
than for unplanned situations. In virtually none of the important resource use situations in North America may the future conditions of
the problem environment be considered controlled. In almost all
cases forecasting is necessary, difficult, and uncertain. Because of the
uncertain nature of forecasts, some provision often needs to be made
to alter resource use as the elements of the problem environment
change.
Provisions for continual review of the problem environment and
for changing the courses of action can be made readily once the need
is recognized. The provision for review and for changing action has
an important effect on the kinds of information needed. Where it
can be incorporated efficiently into a resource-use program, it limits
the importance of long-range forecasts. Forecasts need to be accurate enough only to provide an adequate guide for programs during
a reasonable planning period. Some projects, like large dams, require a longer planning period than others. The failure to recognize
that decisions can be reviewed and actions changed seems to account
partly for attempts to achieve perfect forecasts by means of complex
mathematical formulas.
The writings of Simon and his associates stress the importance of
constant search of the problem environment to identify problems and
the constant evaluation of methods and procedures for coping with
problems. Simon's description of the executive as a decision-maker
applies also to the behavior of the effective citizen, legislator, or administrative staff member involved consciously in making decisions
about the use of resources or environments. Simon says that executives spend a large part of their time surveying the economic, political, and social environment to identify new problems. They probably
spend even a larger part of their time, alone or in group discussion,
developing or discovering courses of action that are suitable for existing or developing problems and in forecasting the consequences of
alternative courses of action. They spend a relatively small part of
their time in selecting among alternative courses of action after the
earlier analyses have been completed.' 7
The injunction that all elements of the decision process should be
17. The New Science of Management Decision, supra note 10, at 2.
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subject to continuous review is especially applicable to decisions related to resource use. Thus, it is desirable to think of the decisionmaker as a continuous processor of information, and to think of each
decision as merely one of a continuous stream of decisions about the
use of a resource or complex of resources. The decision-maker continually reviews information that will discover and state problems,
permit better forecasts of the future and better judgments about the
outcomes of actions, and that will discover new alternative courses
of action. Objectives are reviewed in the light of new information to
determine if changes are possible or desirable. Available techniques
are reviewed for their possible impact on objectives, alternative
courses of action, or consequences of alternative courses of action.
As part of this continual review of the environment, the efficient decision-maker attempts constantly to improve, systematize, and program the operations required.
Programmedand Non-ProgrammedDecisions
One of the important findings of studies of information collecting
and processing is that the ability to collect and process information
is not "given," but is subject to human and technical parameters,
some of which may be changed. Thus, it has been found that the ability to make decisions is improved by practice. Also, it has been found
that decision-making can be improved through the proper organization of information and through the development of explicit procedures for making decisions.
Simon and his colleagues differentiate between "programmed"
and "non-programmed" decisions. Programmed decisions are those
which have to be made repeatedly, and for which routines, standardized procedures, or systematic operations have been developed.1 8
Studies of decision-making in organizations have shown that when
the identification and analysis of problem situations is routinized, the
recognition and analysis of the problem is more likely to take place
and to be done properly. In such cases a standardized routine, program, or procedure is developed which will recognize recurring
problems, do the necessary analysis, and produce an answer from
which the appropriate action follows directly. Simple accounting and
inventory procedures in business, standard operating procedures in
military organizations, standardized formulas in mathematics, and
H.

18. Organizations, supra note 11, at 139-142, 177-180.
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complex computer programs developed in operations research are
examples of programs.
It has been found that "programmed" activity tends to drive out
"non-programmed" activity in organizations. 19 Simon states that the
unstructured and unfamiliar situation is discouraging, rather than
inviting, to most people.2 ° One of the important contributions of
systematic study is to transform "non-programmed" decisions into
"programmed" decisions, by explicating the problem and by stating
the procedures or programs used to analyze or solve it. Thus, study
of a particular resource-use problem may provide a model for many
similar studies and may transform a difficult and non-programmed
problem into one in which the necessary analysis has been programmed.
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing material presents an operational theory of wise
(planned) resource use. It is a statement of the sequence of procedures which are required to insure that the use of resources will meet
stated objectives.
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that the "rational action" of which economists
talk requires that action be preceded by a complete sequence of explicitly considered states in the decision process. In other words, "rational action" is synonymous with "conscious action," and this, in
turn, requires the explicit use of a definite sequence of actions. As a
minimum, in order to consider an allocation or use of resources as
conscious or planned, the decision-process from which it results
should be complete and explicit. This rather impossible dictum needs
to be conditioned by the recognition that decisions must be made by
human beings, and that the completeness and efficiency of the process
is limited by human physiology and psychology. Action taken in the
absence of a complete and explicit choice process may succeed by accident, but it should not be called rational action or conscious action.
Economic theory seems largely to ignore the fact that decisionmaking requires time, effort, and competence, and that it requires information, which must be sought. The decision-maker encountered
in economic theory knows all and makes decisions instantaneously.
An important contribution of operational analysis is the recognition
19. The New Science-of Management Decision, supra note 10, at 13.
20. Id., at 38-40.
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of the decision-maker as a collector and processor of information, as
a person whose behavior is modified by the process of collecting and
processing information, and whose ability to process and analyze information is limited by human physiology and psychology. The recognition that all information required for the decision process must
be sought introduces into the decision process the necessary elements
of time and effort that are missing from the abstract model.
It is notable that the allocation of time in real decision-making is
quite different from the allocation one would expect from economic
theory and from the simplified decision-model on which the operational analysis is based. It is certainly vastly different from the apparent allocation of effort in the model used by Schlaifer and other
statistical-decision-theorists. They have tended to take for granted
the information that needs to be fed into the model, and have focused attention on the later stages of the decision process. However,
even complicated statistical procedures may take a comparatively
small percentage of the total time and effort involved in making a
decision. The collection and interpretation of verbal and numerical
data often accounts for the largest proportion of time and effort. It
does not need to be pointed out that the most sophisticated techniques of analysis are useless when used with faulty information.
One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from experience in operations research is that problems can be attacked directly:
indeed, they must be attacked directly. The standardized decision
process given above provides the procedural outline for direct analysis. It stands in stark contrast to the propositional thinking and deductive reasoning which is required by traditional theoretical approaches. This finding has important implications for the education
of resource and environmental analysts, for the conduct of studies,
and for the provision of information.
The direct approach to resource analysis can reduce the amount of
education required to produce competent analysts, by reducing the
present reliance on traditional theoretical subjects. For example, the
use of the procedures described above seems to eliminate the need
for economic theory as a guide to wise resource use. To put it more
strongly, the use of operational procedures seems to eliminate the
traditional role of ideology as a basis for making decisions about the
use of earth environments. It therefore eliminates the need for the
ideological indoctrination which accounts for so much of the curriculum in universities and professional schools.
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By making the analysis of resource-use problems less of a mystery,
the direct approach could expand public participation in decisionmaking. This could increase the probability of making good decisions
(though many convincing arguments could be produced against this
hope). However, anything that would contribute to public understanding of problems of resource use and use of environments probably would contribute to the acceptance and implementation of good
solutions.
There is considerable evidence that simple and easily-understood
descriptions of resource-use problems are needed to enable most
people to participate in decision-making. Simon cites evidence that
the unstructured and unfamiliar situation is discouraging to most
people. 21 For most people, the recognition of problems in resourceuse, the examination of the physical, economic, and social environment of that problem, and the formulation of alternative courses
of action on the basis of available techniques are "non-programmed"
activities. This reflects not only a problem of information, but also
a psychological problem which must be recognized in improving the
performance of people in making decisions.
Explanation is of less importance than solution from the viewpoint of resource management. Traditionally, the object of much
study was to explain the past and to understand the present. Now
the past and the present should be studied to provide a basis for
action. It is necessary to know only that part of the historical development of a problem which is relevant to a solution. This requires much less exhaustive study of the past, and a concentration on
those aspects of the problem which are relevant to a solution. Information can be useful in the solution of resource-use problems
only if it is suitable for this purpose. It is much more likely to be
useful if it is designed specifically to implement the sequence of
decision-making processes outlined above.
Each problem and decision requires a kind and arrangement of
information that is specific to it. The important and necessary information is that which is needed for the process of decision-making.
It is that which facilitates the testing and formulation of objectives,
the recognition of problems, of occasions for action, and of alternative courses of action, the forecasting of the environment within
which decisions are made, and the recognition of the consequences
of alternative courses of action. Other information may be interest21. Id., at 13.
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ing and stimulating without contributing to the solution of resourceuse problems. By considering explicitly the role of information in
each step of the decision process, it is possible to place the various
kinds of information-direct visual observation, spoken and written words, graphics, and numbers-in proper relationship to the
mental operations that use information.
The direct approach to resource analysis and the standardized
decision process demonstate clearly that generalized information
has limited utility for making specific decisions about the use of
resources and environments. A generalization can be accepted only
if it is supported by evidence. This means, in practice, that a generalization must always be accompanied by its supporting evidence.
The practical purpose of a generalization is to facilitate the retrieval
from storage of blocks of specific information. The principal aim of
many scholarly studies has been to produce generalizations that have
independent validity. Specific information has been considered important only insofar as it would yield generalizations. But in using
studies of this kind in the solution of conservation problems, the
specific information is extracted and the generalizations often are
not used. Consider the concepts developed about the changing composition of plant communities. In problems of managing vegetation
to attain given objectives, concepts of succession, climax, and the like
may be of slight importance; what is important are the procedures
available to change the composition of the vegetation and to maintain desirable compositions, and the probable effects of these
procedures.
The most persistent objection which I have encountered to the
use of the standardized decision process as a guide to the wise use
of resources and environments is its apparent lack of a normative or
prescriptive content. According to economic theory, from which
much of the work in operations research and management science
derives, the major objective of decision-making should be the attainment of efficiency, which usually implies a minimizing or maximizing
solution to a technique of numerical analysis. The operational analysis of the concept of economic efficiency, which has been carried out
by operations research and management science, suggests that efficiency should not invariably be considered the major objective of
decision-makers. The important thing is that the decision process
should result in action that meets the objectives of the decisionmaker, whatever these may be. As to objectives, it seems to require
only that they be arrived at through the explicit consideration of the
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accepted objectives in comparison with other objectives that are
available to the decision-maker.
It seems very unsatisfying to many people to be told simply that
a good decision is one that meets the objectives of the decision-maker.
It is apparent that a decision that meets the objectives of one individual or group does not necessarily meet the objectives of another individual or group. More particularly, a decision that might satisfy
the objectives of an individual or small group might be contrary to
the apparent objectives of society. Students especially, and many professional conservationists, seem to feel that this formulation would
condone as a good decision any kind of selfish action by individuals,
firms, or government agencies. To resolve this problem, it is necessary only to recognize that there may be, and are, many objectives
that might be entertained in deciding about any use of resources.
There are objectives of individuals, of firms, of government agencies, and finally, of that amorphous concept, "society." Thus, one
person might make different judgments about the best decision in his
separate roles as individual owner of land, as member of a firm
involved in the problem, as taxpayer in an affected community, as
resident of an affected county, and as resident of a state, region, and
nation. Situations come to mind in which the "best decision" might
be different for each of these different points of view. The current
controversies over the diversions of water within and between
states, regions, and even countries can provide many examples of the
different viewpoints that may be developed in relation to any
important resource or environment.
A case in point exists in the use of forest resources. Profit maximization is often the major objective of manufacturing firms. A
wood processing firm which has the option of investing its money in
some other industrial activity, such as metal fabricating, may find it
more profitable to liquidate its timber holdings and wood processing
facilities and to invest the proceeds in an activity yielding a higher
return. Some undesirable social consequences might flow from such
a move, for example, the destruction of the economic base of a
community by the premature cutting of timber.
There might also be differences between apparent national and
regional objectives in the use of forest resources. For example, national objectives might require only the production of enough wood
to meet present and future needs. This requirement might be met by
a migratory wood processing industry that overcut the forest resource of one region after another, returning to each region after a
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long hiatus of production when sufficient growth had occurred. This
pattern has been seen recently in the operations of the wood processing industry in the United States and western Canada. Although it
was not brought about by a conscious national policy, it can be said
to have met some minimum conditions of national policy. Such a
policy does not encourage stability or steady and permanent development of regional wood processing industries.
Differences between regional objectives in the use of forest resources may also exist. For example, residents of a region might be
concerned primarily with maximizing wood production, income and
jobs, while residents of another region, perhaps in a more favorable
economic situation, might prefer to have the forest resource of the
first region managed so as to maximize scenic and recreational values
for tourists.
One of the advantages of the standardized decision process as
given here is its flexibility and utility in a wide range of situations.
It is usable in making personal decisions that border on the trivial
and in making national decisions of the utmost importance. To introduce normative statements would limit its flexibility. However, the
objections of those who would focus on social objectives can be met
adequately for any specific rsource-use situation by identifying and
stating apparent or idealized objectives of society and determining
which of the alternative courses of action would satisfy these
objectives.
The lack of intellectual certainty about whether or not a decision
is a good one is disquieting, but reflects accurately the environment
of uncertainty and continual change which is characteristic of all important problems of use of resources and environments. It is, in my
view, a great step forward to say that a decision seems to be the best
we can do under the circumstances, instead of trying to show that it
meets the non-operational criteria of economic efficiency that are
found in some economic theories. In any case, it still is true that the
only criteria of good decisions are that: (1) they are workable, or
operational; (2) they are arrived at by conscious, systematic use of
all relevant information, following the sequence given above; and
(3) they meet the conscious objectives of the decision-maker.
This detailed consideration of the process of decision-making suggests that economic concepts of optimal resource-use are not operational. Optimal resource-use, as discussed by economists, requires
virtually complete knowledge and continuous analysis of this knowledge. It would be difficult for an individual to specify an optimal
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solution for a given problem of rsource-use. In place of searching for
the "best" alternative, the decision-maker is usually concerned with
finding a satisfactory alternative-one that will attain a specified
22
goal and at the same time satisfy a number of auxiliary conditions.
It is beyond belief that an organization, acting in a political context,
could arrive at and implement an optimal solution. But, to think of
"society" achieving an optimal solution is in the realm of fantasy.
This would require that a substantial part of society engage effectively in the process of decision-making described above. I know of
no evidence that a substantial part of society engages in effective
decision-making about any major resource. More significant, there
are important technical, informational, cultural, political, and psychological barriers to effective decision-making by society. The concepts of optimal resource allocation by society is non-operational,
and should be discarded.
There is another objection to the use of the standardized decision
process for allocating resources: there can be no guarantee that a
conscientious use of the standardized decision process will choose a
course of action that will really satisfy the objectives of the decisionmaker. There may have been a failure to forecast accurately the
future conditions in the problem environment, or the consequences of
the available courses of action. Or there may have been a failure to
identify the real objectives of the decision-maker. Other errors of
procedure and interpretation may have occurred. There is no answer
to this objection, except to say that no other available procedure can
offer a better chance of success.

22. R. Cyert, H. Simon, & D. Trow, Observation of a Business Decision, supra note

